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Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, Barbary Hanan,
an Afghan citizen, was admitted into the United States.' A few years later
Hanan was convicted of heroin possession and sentenced to three years
imprisonment.2 In a hearing before an immigration judge, Hanan requested to
remain in the United States on grounds that gross human rights violations
occurring in Afghanistan made him potentially eligible for relief under the
U.N. Convention Against Torture.3 After an immigration judge denied his
request and ordered him deported, Hanan filed an appeal in federal court,
claiming that the immigration judge erred in determining that he failed to
establish that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if returned to
Afghanistan.4 The Eighth Circuit dismissed Hanan's petition for review,
stating that Hanan was primarily challenging factual determinations made by
an immigration judge that were outside the scope of federal court
jurisdiction.5
Consider now the case of Selemawit Giday, a citizen of Eritrea who
entered the United States in January 2002.6 Nine months after arriving in the
United States, the government initiated proceedings to remove her from the
country on grounds that she was not formerly admitted. 7 At her removal
hearing, Giday requested relief in the form of asylum, alleging that her
partial Ethiopian ancestry subjected her to persecution in Eritrea.8 An
immigration judge rejected her request for asylum on grounds that she failed
to demonstrate past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future
persecution should she return to Eritrea. 9 When Giday filed a petition for
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I Hanan v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 834, 835 (8th Cir. 2006).2 Id.
3 Id. See infra note 45 and accompanying text for an explanation of the U.N.
Convention Against Torture.4 Id.
5 Id. at 835-36.
6 Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2006).
7 Id. at 546.
8Id.
9 Id. at 554.
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review with the Seventh Circuit, the court not only claimed that it had
jurisdiction to hear Giday's appeal, but remanded the case to an- immigration
judge to consider a more recent version of the U.S. State, Department
Country Reports detailing political conditions in Eritrea. 10
While such inconsistencies are at odds with the presumption of a uniform
immigration policy,"I variations of these situations frequently appear before
the 215 immigration courts across the country as well as the federal courts of
appeals.' 2 Non-citizens who are ordered to be removed from the country may
apply for various forms of relief during removal proceedings before an
immigration court, such as applying for asylum, withholding of removal due
to a fear of persecution if returned to their country, or on grounds that
returning them to their country of origin would violate the U.N. Convention
Against Torture.' 3 If an immigration court and the Board of Immigration
Appeals denies such requests, these individuals are generally entitled to file a
petition for review in federal court.14 As demonstrated by Giday and Hanan,
federal courts have been inconsistent with respect to the types of removal
claims over which they claim jurisdiction. A controversy exists over the
degree of discretion immigration courts should be afforded in determining
whether otherwise deportable aliens can obtain relief from removal. 15 How
much discretion should be afforded to immigration courts which are
administrative agencies of the executive branch, and how much independent
review should be accorded to the federal judiciary? Such questions are
germane to the current legal climate.
I. THE CURRENT PROBLEM: TENSIONS BETWEEN IMMIGRATION COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
In recent years, federal appellate judges have directed severe criticisms at
immigration judges (IJs), 16 as a high volume of appeals from immigration
10 Id. at 556. In Hanan v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit did not consider Hanan's
contention that country reports in the years following the immigration judge's decision
demonstrated a high probability of torture if he returned to Afghanistan because such
reports were not part of the administrative record. 449 F.3d 834, 837 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006).
11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power... To establish
a uniform Rule of Naturalization").
12 See infra Part IV (discussing specific cases).
13 See IRA KURZBAN, IMMIGRATiON LAW SOURCEBOOK 253-55, 787 (2006). See also
infra Part II.
14 KURZBAN, supra note 13, at 259. See also infra Part H.B.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See, e.g., Chain v. Attorney General, 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006) (criticizing
the immigration judge for "bullying" the petitioner "to bits"); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales,
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courts have flooded circuit courts. 17 Petitions to review decisions of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) currently comprise a significant
proportion of the caseload in the courts of appeals. 18 Appellate courts have
seen a particular increase in petitions for review from noncitizens seeking
relief from final orders of removal. 19 The growing number of immigration
appeals is creating a "burden" on the federal appeals courts. 20 Additionally, a
considerable degree of attention has been directed at immigration courts for a
lack of uniformity in immigration decisions.21 A study released in July 2006
434 F.3d 627, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2006) (commenting on how the l interjected "intemperate
and bias-laden remarks," "none of which had any basis in the facts introduced, or the
arguments made, at the hearing"); Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error
in Immigration Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2596, 2597 (2006) ("The crisis identified by
circuit judges is that immigration courts are getting too many decisions wrong. The cases
depict a system handicapped by both error and abuse, failing in its responsibility to apply
the law.").
17 Immigration cases comprised approximately 17% of all federal appeals in 2006,
an increase of 3% from 2001. Rachel L. Swarns, In Bills' Small Print, Critics See a
Threat to Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2006, at A11. A significant backlog of
pending immigration appeals exists, with the largest number of cases in the Ninth and
Second Circuits. The backlog has "the potential to impair the quality of justice that
appellants deserve, and that the United States is obligated to afford." Immigration
Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 91
(2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
18 See JAMES C. DUFF, U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 115 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/
contents.html (documenting that the total number of petitions to review a Board of
Immigration Appeals decision rose from 4449 in 2002 to 11,911 in 2006). For a detailed
breakdown of the types of decisions made by immigration courts, see ExECuTIVE OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2005 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK
(2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy05syb.pdf.
19 See Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review
and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 47 (2006-2007) (explaining that during the past ten years there
has been a 970% increase in the number of cases seeking judicial review of immigration
orders). Immigration cases comprise more than 18% of the federal appellate court civil
docket. Id. at 47. The majority of BIA appeals filed in the Ninth and Second Circuits
involved petitions to review the denial of a request for political asylum. Id. at 48.
20 Editorial, Don't Tamper With the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A24.
21 One law professor's study of immigration judges indicates that, on average,
approximately 38% of all asylum petitions are granted. Most judges fall within a range of
25-50%. But some grant 10% of asylum petitions and others grant 80 or 90%. See
Margaret Graham Tebo, Asylum Ordeals; Some Immigrants Are 'Ground to Bits' In a
System that Leaves Immigration Judges Impatient, Appellate Courts Irritated and
Lawyers Frustrated, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 36, 38-39. Immigration judges vary
considerably in their willingness to grant asylum, with denial rates ranging from 10% to
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found that even among immigration judges in the same jurisdiction, hearing
cases of asylum seekers from the same country, the disparity rate was
considerable. 22 A number of circuit courts have expressed "frustration" with
the handling of asylum cases by IJs and their treatment of immigrants during
asylum hearings.23 In one year alone, the Seventh Circuit remanded 40
percent of the 136 immigration cases it considered, "rejecting rulings of the
administrative judges in stern and often scathing language. 24
In response to the growing number of criticisms directed at IJs, in
January 2006, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales proclaimed to
embark on a "comprehensive review" of the Immigration Courts and the
Board,25 and to institute yearly performance evaluations of IJs, who are
Justice Department employees. 26 In response to the high volume of
immigration cases in federal courts, in May 2006 the Senate passed the
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act. 27 One of the more controversial
provisions is entitled "Immigration Review Reform," which requires a GAO
study of the appellate process in immigration appeals cases, including the
consideration of consolidating all such appeals into one existing circuit court,
more than 98%. From 2000 to 2005, an IJ in Miami rejected 96.7% of asylum petitions,
whereas an IJ in NY rejected 9.8% of asylum petitions. Id. at 39. The median denial rate
was 65%. Seeking Asylum in the U.S.? Choose Your Judge Carefully, WASH. POST, Aug.
1, 2006, at A 15.
22 Seeking Asylum in the US.?, supra note 21, at A15 (citing Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), New Findings, http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/cuffent
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008)). See also Nina Bernstein, New York's Immigration Courts
Lurch Under a Growing Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A39 (discussing how 90%
of asylum cases were granted by one immigration judge, whereas only 9% of asylum
cases were granted by another judge).
23 Tebo, supra note 21, at 38 (noting that appellate judges have questioned the
"skills and temperament" of immigration judges whose asylum cases are increasingly
appealed, resulting in a "logjam in the federal circuits").
24 Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Jon Yates, Judges Fumble Asylum Cases: Refugee
Was Sent Back to Sudan to Face Jail, Beatings, CHI. TRm., Sept. 24, 2006, § 1, at 1. See
also Maria Arhancet, Developments in the Judicial Branch: U.S. Attorney General
Orders Review ofImmigration Courts, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 333, 333 (2006) (explaining
that among the allegations against immigration judges are that they have deported aliens
who would face persecution and have made inappropriate remarks during immigration
proceedings).
25 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9,
2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2008). See also Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judges Facing Yearly Performance
Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at A14.
26 Bernstein, supra note 22, at Al.
27 S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 707 (2006).
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such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.28 This proposal,
which would provide the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with
exclusive jurisdiction to review a final order of removal from immigration
courts, has "touched off an outcry" from a number of legal scholars and
federal judges. 29 Ironically, Congress is attempting to limit alien access to
federal courts during a period in which IJs are being criticized for their
handling of immigration cases. 30
This Note contends that further attempts to limit the scope of judicial
review over final orders of removal would have adverse consequences for
deportable aliens seeking relief from removal in the form of asylum,
withholding of removal due to a clear probability of persecution if returned
to their country of origin, or protection under the U.N. Convention Against
Torture. While a considerable amount of attention has been directed at
immigration courts and individual IJs for a lack of uniformity in rendering
decisions,31 this Note examines how circuit courts have been similarly
inconsistent with respect to the types of removal claims over which they have
jurisdiction, by specifically looking at the impact of the REAL ID Act.32
Passed in 2005, the REAL ID Act "reflects a congressional intent to ...
streamline immigration proceedings and to expedite removal while restoring
judicial review of constitutional and legal issues."33
When the REAL ID was passed, numerous commentators considered the
Act's potential to restrict federal jurisdiction over immigration issues.34 This
28 S. 2611.
29 Swains, supra note 17, at All. For a detailed criticism of this proposal, see
Editorial, supra note 20, at A24, which argues that "[j]udges and law professors have
been sharply critical of the proposal ... [because] one of the strengths of the federal
judicial system is that cases are heard by judges of general jurisdiction." Making the
Federal Circuit Court the nation's immigration appeals court may lead to judges being
appointed based on their immigration politics. Id.
30 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
32 See infra Part IlI.
33 Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2005).
34 See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial
Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal
Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 37, 47 (2006-2007); Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part
of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the "Rule" of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 161 (2006-2007); Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitution's
Most Important Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID
Act, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1368 (2006); David M. McConnell, Judicial Review
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act: Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID
(1996-2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75 (2006-2007); Sarah A. Moore, Note, Tearing
Down the Fence Around Immigration Law: Examining the Lack of Judicial Review and
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Note builds on this literature by examining the extent to which the REAL ID
Act has engendered inconsistent federal circuit court decisions in relief from
removal cases.
Part II provides an overview of relief from removal and the role of
immigration courts in removal proceedings. Part III provides a historical
analysis of judicial review of immigration court decisions and briefly
examines the standard of review federal courts have used to evaluate appeals
from immigration courts in relief from removal cases. Part IV provides an
analysis of the REAL ID Act's impact on judicial review of final orders of
removal. Part V concludes by examining alternatives for adjudicating relief
from removal cases in a way that achieves judicial economy, while also
ensuring procedural fairness in removal hearings.
II. RELIEF FROM REMOVAL
A. Background on Removal and Relief
Non-citizens lawfully present in the United States are subject to removal
from the country upon order of the Attorney General if they fall within one
or more of the statutory classes of deportable aliens under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA). 35 Similarly, an individual who enters the United
States illegally or without proper inspection by immigration officials is
subject to deportation from the United States.36 Deporting an alien 37 carries
grave consequences; "[a]lthough not penal in character, deportation statutes
as a practical matter may inflict 'the equivalent of banishment or
the Impact of the REAL ID Act While Calling for a Broader Reading of Questions of Law
to Encompass "Extreme Cruelty," 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2037 (2007); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459 (2006); Gerald L. Neuman, The Adequacy of
Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (2006-2007).
35 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000). The INA enumerates a number of crimes for
which a non-citizen, lawfully present in the United States, can be removed. Included
among these are violations of U.S. or foreign law; statutorily listed crimes such as drug
offenses, firearm offenses, and domestic violence offenses; and "crimes of moral
turpitude." § 1227(a)(2).
36 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6) (2000).
37 This Note will use "deportation" and "removal" interchangeably. Prior to 1996,
the immigration statutes distinguished between deportation hearings and exclusion
hearings. Benson, supra note 19, at 41 n.7. The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) eliminated the legal distinction between




exile' .. . ."38 A deportable alien trying to avoid removal may seek several
forms of relief, such as voluntary departure, cancellation of removal,
adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of removal, and waiver. 39 This
Note, however, will focus on the forms of relief available to deportable aliens
who fear persecution on account of one of five protected categories if
returned to their country of origin. These individuals can seek relief from
removal in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under
the U.N. Convention Against Torture.
An alien who is physically present in the United States, or who arrives in
the United States regardless of whether they are legally or illegally in the
country, is permitted to apply for asylum.40 The Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security have discretion to grant asylum if an
individual satisfies the INA's definition of a "refugee." 41 To qualify for
withholding of removal, a non-citizen is required to demonstrate that there is
a "clear probability of persecution" if returned to his native country.42 While
asylum is a discretionary form of relief, for which the standard is a "well-
founded fear of persecution," 43 withholding of removal is mandatory for
those who can satisfy the higher standard of a "clear probability of
persecution." 44 To gain protection under the U.N. Convention Against
38 Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954) (quoting Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
39 KURZBAN, supra note 13, at 787.
40 8 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000).
41 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2005). A refugee is one
who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person habitually resided
... who is unable or unwilling to return to... that country because of persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion ....
8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
42 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)
(2000) ("The Attorney General may not remove an alien ... if the Attorney General
decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the
alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.").
43 INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 423-24 (1987) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(a)(42) (1982)).
44 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 409. Another important difference between the two forms of
relief is that an alien who has been granted asylum has been temporarily admitted into the
United States; whereas an alien who is granted withholding of removal has not been
granted legal entry into the United States and may be removed to his country when there
is no longer any threat to his life or freedom. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 168 (2005). The
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Torture (CAT), an individual must demonstrate that it is "more likely than
not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal."'45 A petition for protection under the CAT differs from requests for
asylum and withholding of deportation in that the alien "need not
demonstrate that he will be tortured on account of a particular belief or
immutable characteristic," but rather he must establish a likelihood of being
subjected to torturous acts inflicted by a public official. 46
The Department of Justice has found that "[i]n most removal
proceedings, aliens concede that they are removable, but then apply for one
or more forms of relief from removal. '47 Many of the non-citizens applying
for relief are deported because they have overstayed visas, 48 are in the United
States illegally,4 9 or have been convicted of a crime. 50 Since relief from
removal permits otherwise deportable aliens to remain in the United States,
efforts to expand judicial review over final orders of removal issued by
immigration courts are contentious. While relief from removal is sometimes
degree of persecution necessary to obtain relief from removal is an "extreme concept"
requiring "more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation ...
[m]ere harassment is not persecution." Sepulveda v. Attorney General, 401 F.3d 1226,
1231 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gonzales v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (1 1th Cir. 2000)).
45 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2007). The Convention Against Torture (CAT) provides
that "[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, para. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.I.S. 85. On
April 18, 1988, the United States became a party to CAT. 136 CONG. REc. 36, 192-99
(1990).
46 Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 725 (3d Cir. 2003).
47 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: IMMIGRATION COURT PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES: REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, BOND REDETERMINATIONS, ASYLUM,
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 2 (Apr. 28, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/
05/ImmigrationCourtProcess2005.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
48 See, e.g., Boctor v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 488, 489-91 (7th Cir. 2007) (petitioning
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT based on an alleged fear of
religious persecution if returned to Egypt).
49 See, e.g., Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 994 (7th Cir. 2006) (seeking political
asylum and withholding of deportation to China after entering the United States without a
valid passport or visa).
50 See, e.g., Kamara v. Attorney Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT after a conviction for
selling cocaine); William K. Rashbaum, 3 Relatives of Plotter Are Held by Officials, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at B 1 (seeking relief from removal by applying for status as an
asylee on grounds that he fears religious persecution if returned to Pakistan, after
conviction for conspiring to place an explosive device in Herald Square subway station in
2004 and a final order of deportation was filed against him).
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regarded as a potential for abuse, where non-citizens who otherwise would
be deported can fabricate stories of persecution in their native country,51 it is
also acknowledged that "[r]emoval visits a great hardship on the individual
and deprives him [or her] of the right to stay and live and work.. ." in this
country.52 Before discussing the difficulties appellate courts face in
adjudicating relief from removal cases, it is necessary to provide a brief
discussion of the role of immigration courts in removal proceedings.
B. The Process of Obtaining Relief from Removal: The Role of the
Immigration Court
Removal proceedings are initiated by the Department of Homeland
Security and are adjudicated by IJs. 53 IJs, who currently handle 300,000
cases each year,54 are administrative judges within the Executive Office for
Immigration Review and are appointed by the Attorney General. 55 Once an
IJ renders a decision, the non-citizen or the Department of Homeland
Security may appeal to the BIA. 56 The BIA has appellate jurisdiction to
review final decisions of IJs in removal cases. 57 Since immigration courts are
51 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary,
Sensenbrenner Praises REAL ID Act's Inclusion in Supplemental Conference Report 1
(May 4, 2005), http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/REALlDconfagree42905.pdf (last
visited Apr. 20, 2008) (commenting on how the REAL ID Act of 2005 will "weed out
fraudulent asylum applications made by people lying through their teeth"); Press Release,
Rep. Orrin Hatch, Congressional Republicans Unveil Immigration Reform Legislation
(May 19, 2004) (on file with author) (commenting that a proposed bill to consolidate all
immigration appeals to one federal circuit will target aliens "who intend to prolong their
stay by filing frivolous petitions").
52 Kaweesa v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2006).
53 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Immigration Court Process in the United
States 1 (Apr. 28, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/05/ImmigrationCourtProcess
2005.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). Removal proceedings are generally the most
frequent form of proceedings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR). Id.
54 Bernstein, supra note 25.
55 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(4) (2000). An immigration judge, who is under the
supervision of the Attorney General, performs duties prescribed by the Attorney General.
Id. "Subject to any specific limitation prescribed by the Act and this chapter, immigration
judges shall also exercise the discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney
General ... as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases." 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.31 (2007).
56 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2007).
57 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). Like Immigration Courts, the BIA is part of the
Department of Justice, subject to the general supervision of the Executive Office for
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not Article III courts, but rather agencies under the authority of the Attorney
General, 58 "[i]mmigration hearings qualitatively differ from the typical
American model of civil adjudication which is so heavily dependent on
liberal pre-trial discovery of evidence." 59 Unlike an Article III judge, an IJ is
not only a fact-finder and adjudicator, but also has an affirmative obligation
to establish and develop the record in the course of withholding of
deportation and asylum proceedings.60 The BIA is also expected to ensure
uniformity of decision making 6' by providing a standardized interpretation of
the Immigration and Nationality Act for IJs to follow. 62
Despite providing clear guidelines for IJs to follow, immigration court
decisions are increasingly appealed to the BIA, which are then increasingly
appealed in federal courts.63 Some attribute this to the administrative review
process rather than to individual IJs. 64 It has also been argued that
Immigration Review (EOIR) of the DOJ, and its attorneys are appointed by the Attorney
General. § 1003.1(a)(1). The BIA reviews facts determined by the IJ, such as the
credibility of testimony, under a "clearly erroneous" standard, 8 C.F.R. § 1003. 1(d)(3)(i)
(2004), and will not engage in a de novo review of findings of fact made by an U, In re
S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462,464-66 (B.I.A. 2002).
58 Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the
1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2537 (1998).
59 Ni v. Attorney General, 210 F. App'x 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2006).
60 Boci v. Gonzales 473 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 2007). See also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(1) (2000) ("[An IJ shall] receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and
cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.").
61 Jeffrey L. Romig, Administrative Review of Cases Involving the Exercise of
Discretion Under Section 212(c): Should the Board of Immigration Appeals Adopt an
"Abuse of Discretion" Standard?, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 63, 70 (1995). Applicants should
expect that a request is given "uniform consideration regardless of whether they appeared
initially in Miami or Anchorage, Boston or San Diego." Id.
62 Evelyn Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of
Immigration Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 48 1,
499-500 (2005). ("In recent years, BIA decisions have become more meaningful as
Congress has sought to limit the availability of circuit court appellate review.").
63 See John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent
Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (explaining that during
the 1990s the BIA "accumulated a lengthy backlog of cases"). In March 2002, the BIA
had a backlog of over 56,000 cases. Id. This led to appellate courts receiving roughly five
times as many petitions for review as they did prior to 2002. Id at 3-4.
64 See Susan Compemolle et al., Op-Ed., Judging Immigration Court Decisions,
CHI. TRm., Oct. 13, 2006, at 30 (explaining that individual IJs are not to blame for poor
decisions). Immigration attorneys contend that the DOJ's system for handling
immigration court cases is equally problematic; immigration judges are assigned more
cases than they are equipped to handle. Id
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congressional efforts to limit federal court review over immigration court
decisions has ironically had the effect of increasing the number of petitions
filed in federal courts.65 However, before providing an analysis of the current
controversy, it is necessary to provide a brief historical overview of judicial
review of immigration court decisions.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS OF DEPORTATION
It has been noted that immigration policy and judicial review have the
markers of "a kind of oil-and-water relationship."66 Under the plenary
immigration power doctrine, a judicially created doctrine, "the judicial
branch must defer to executive and legislative branch decision-making" 67 in
65 Benson, supra note 19, at 72. See also Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra
note 17 (explaining that reforms directed at the BIA to reduce the backlog of cases such
as using fewer judges to review individual cases, thus affording petitioners even less
meaningful review, have resulted in increasing the number of immigration appeals in
federal courts).
66 Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1615 (2000).
67 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). The plenary power doctrine has its
origins in Chae Chan Ping v. United States where the Supreme Court upheld a
congressional act prohibiting Chinese laborers from entering the United States. 130 U.S.
581, 589-90, 610-11 (1889). Under the logic of Chae Chan Ping, Congress could
exclude aliens from admission to the country on the basis of race, under the pretense of
its "plenary power." See VICTOR ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRATION RIGHTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 163 (2005). Since then the Court has
consistently deferred to Congress with respect to immigration policy. See, e.g., Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting "the limited scope of judicial inquiry into
immigration legislation" authority to regulate aliens is "of a political character and
therefore subject only to narrow judicial review"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972) (holding that the First Amendment imposed no barrier on the Attorney General's
decision to deny a temporary nonimmigrant visa to a Belgian journalist who espoused
Marxist views); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1954) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which permitted deporting aliens
who were members of the Communist Party). See also Gerald Neuman, Discretionary
Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 618-19 (2006). Neuman found that:
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court derived from international
law a constitutional conception of Congress's absolute substantive power to deny
aliens entry to the United States or to expel them from its territory, unconstrained by
any judicially enforceable constitutional limits.... [T]he Bill of Rights placed no
judicially enforceable barrier to congressional adoption of immigration policies that
separated husbands from wives, or parents from children, penalized unpopular
views, or discriminated by race.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
matters related to immigration. The authority to remove non-citizens from
the United States is considered "essentially a power of the political branches
of government, the legislative, and executive, [a power that] may be
exercised entirely through executive officers, 'with such opportunity for
judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit to authorize or
permit.' 68 The granting of asylum is considered discretionary, 69 and no
judicial review of deportation orders is guaranteed by the Constitution.70 At
the same time, non-citizens placed in deportation proceedings are afforded
"quasi" constitutional protections. While non-citizens are entitled to
procedural due process during removal proceedings, 71 a removal proceeding
is viewed as distinct from a criminal proceeding, 72 and as such, unlike in
criminal proceedings, non-citizens have no right to counsel during
deportation proceedings. 73 Nonetheless, it has been noted that there is a
"strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action. '74
Part III.A will provide a brief historical explanation of the relationship
between judicial review and immigration court decisions. Part III.B will
discuss one development in particular, the INS v. St. Cyr case. Part III.C will
then examine the standard of review federal courts have used to evaluate
decisions made by immigration courts in relief from removal cases. Part III.D
will discuss credibility determinations, an important element of relief from
removal cases.
68 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1952) (citation omitted).
69 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
70 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 537.
71 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("[T]he Due Process Clause [of
the Fifth Amendment] applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."). The Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings. Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Due process requires that a court afford an applicant a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on
her behalf. Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 538 (7th Cir. 2005). However,
an alien does not have a constitutional right to discretionary relief from removal. United
Sates v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). While an alien may raise a
constitutional or legal claim arising from the refusal of an agency to consider him for
discretionary relief, he may not challenge the agency's decision to exercise or not
exercise its discretion to grant relief. Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 203 (1st Cir.
2003).
72 Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2006).
73 See Karin Brullard, Battling Deportation Often a Solitary Journey, WASH. POST,
Jan. 8, 2007, at Al (noting that a growing number of aliens appearing before immigration
courts have no legal counsel).
74 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001) (citation omitted).
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A. A Historical Overview of Judicial Review of Immigration Court
Decisions
Congress first provided for "suspension of deportation" in 1940 by
adding such a provision to the Immigration Act of 1917.75 "Suspension of
deportation" was not a right afforded to deportable aliens, but was dispensed
according to the "unfettered discretion of the Attorney General. '76 Despite
the discretionary nature of deportation, a non-citizen who wished to
challenge a final order of removal could file a habeas corpus petition in a
federal district court.77 Thus, even in the absence of specific statutory
provisions providing for judicial review of final orders of removal, federal
courts assumed jurisdiction in immigration cases "because of the simple fact
that physical restraint was inherently involved in the removal of an unwilling
noncitizen." 78 The Supreme Court, however, has noted that the terms
"judicial review" and "habeas corpus" have historically distinct meanings. 79
75Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 155(c) (Supp. V 1946)). See also Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 356 n.15 (1956). The
provision provided that the Attorney General may suspend deportation under certain
circumstances. Id.
7 6 JJay, 351 U.S. at 354. The suspension of deportation was regarded as "an act of
grace" by the Attorney General. INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1982). See
also United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950)
(quoting Judge Learned Hand) ("The power of the Attorney General to suspend
deportation is a dispensing power, like a judge's power to suspend the execution of a
sentence, or the President's to pardon a convict."). See also S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 3
(1952) (stating that this grant of suspension is entirely discretionary).
77 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305-06 (2001). Prior to the enactment of the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act, the exclusive means available to non-citizens who
wished to challenge a final order of deportation was by filing a writ of habeas corpus. Id.
at 306. The writ of habeas corpus was "a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention." Id. at 301. Cf Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law,
78 TEX. L. REv. 1661, 1664 (2000) ("The physical custody inherent in the deportation
process triggers the applicability of the Suspension Clause, despite the fact that the
individuals detained are aliens, and despite the fact that the detention occurs as part of the
regulation of immigration.").
78 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 459, 461 (2006); see also Heikkila v.
Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 231-33 (1953) (stating that, while the 1917 Immigration Act stated
that the Attorney General's decision to deport an alien is final, the Attorney General's
discretion "d[id] not settle the question" of whether judicial review was precluded);
Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (citing Heikkila, 345 U.S.
at 233) (explaining that, while the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act states that "[i]n
any case in which an alien is ordered deported from the United States under the
provisions of this Act, or of any other law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General
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Despite efforts on the part of federal courts to provide judicial review of
final orders of removal, Congress has consistently attempted to restrict access
to federal courts for deportable aliens. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which barred
review of deportation orders of non-citizens who had certain criminal
convictions.80 AEDPA also eliminated review of most discretionary
determinations related to relief from removal. 81 Shortly after AEDPA was
passed, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which placed certain determinations made by
immigration courts beyond the scope of judicial review. 82 While both
AEDPA and IlRIRA contained provisions eliminating habeas review of
deportation and removal orders issued against criminal aliens,83 federal
courts retained jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over habeas corpus
petitions brought by aliens in custody pursuant to a deportation order. 84
shall be final," the word "final" does not necessarily exclude judicial review of an
administrative decision).
79 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 311; see also Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 236 ("[I]t is the scope of
inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates [habeas review from] judicial review .... ).
In Heikkila, even though the Court determined that the 1917 Immigration Act barred an
alien from directly attacking a deportation order, the Court affirmed the right to habeas
corpus. Id. at 236-37. Appellate courts have also drawn this distinction. See, e.g., Saint
Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 203 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that the scope of habeas
review is not the same as the scope of statutory judicial review in the courts of appeals).
80 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). The Act precluded all judicial review of final removal orders of
aliens deported for committing certain types of crimes, such as an "aggravated felony."
Id. § 440(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (2000)).
81 Id. § 440(d) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000)) (restricting discretionary relief
for aliens removable for having committed aggravated felonies and drug-related crimes).
82 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-549 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000)). IIRIRA
provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of
an alien arising from a decision or action of the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien. Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999). For a further discussion of
the impact of AEDPA and IIRIRA on judicial review of deportation orders, see Gerald L.
Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 1963, 1975-78 (2000).
83 See H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 172-73 (2005).
84 See, e.g., Dunbar v. INS, 64 F. Supp. 2d 47, 50-51 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding that,
even in light of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of AEPDA and IIRIRA, Congress
did not expressly limit federal judicial petitions for writs of habeas corpus). The district
courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) to review the Attorney General's
decision denying an alien discretionary relief. Id.
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B. The Significance of INS v. St. Cyr
INS v. St. Cyr is regarded as a major development in the history of
judicial review of immigration decisions.85 AEDPA and IIRIRA had both
contained provisions eliminating habeas review of deportation orders issued
against criminal aliens.86 In INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that
neither AEDPA nor IIRIRA denied federal courts jurisdiction over habeas
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 brought by criminal aliens who were
in custody under a deportation order.87 Following the St. Cyr decision, non-
citizens who were guilty of a deportable criminal offense were permitted to
seek review of their removal orders in district court and then appeal to the
circuit courts of appeals, whereas non-criminal aliens were able to generally
seek review only in the courts of appeals.88 Congress thus became concerned
that non-citizens who "committed serious crimes in the United States [were]
able to obtain more judicial review than non-criminal aliens. '89
The REAL ID Act of 2005 was enacted in part to "cure the anomalies"
created by St. Cyr and its progeny by depriving criminal aliens of the
opportunity to bring petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but permitting a
circuit court to review "those issues that were historically reviewable on
habeas." 90 Passed in 2005, the REAL ID Act stripped district courts of
jurisdiction to hear any final orders of removal and placed review of all final
removal orders for both criminal and non-criminal aliens in the courts of
appeals. 91 By placing judicial review of deportation orders in the courts of
85 See, e.g., Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2007) ("In INS v. St.
Cyr, the Supreme Court determined the scope of judicial review in a post-
AEDPA/IIRIRA regime in light of the requirements of the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution."); Motomura, supra note 78, at 466 (explaining that INS v. St. Cyr
addressed the question of the standard of review in immigration habeas cases).
86 See AEDPA § 440; IIRIRA § 242(2)(C).
87 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001).
88 Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 153 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006). Prior
to the REAL ID Act, the courts of appeals were divided over whether the district courts
possessed habeas jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to deportation orders
brought by non-criminal aliens. Ishak v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2005).
89 H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 174 (2005).
90 Id. at 174-75.
91 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(5), 119 Stat. 302, 316
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). The REAL ID Act provides that
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including
section 2241 of title 28 ... a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for
judicial review of an order of removal .... For purposes of this Act, in every
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appeals, Congress sought to streamline what it referred to as "bifurcated and
piecemeal" review of orders of removal. 92 The REAL ID Act. eliminated
habeas jurisdiction over final orders of deportation, providing instead for
petitions for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which circuit courts alone can
consider.93
The Supreme Court has held that if habeas is eliminated, Congress must
offer "a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective" to
challenge the legality of a person's detention. 94 Congress was aware of this
when it passed the REAL ID Act, and as it noted during the congressional
debates, under the holding of INS v. St. Cyr, there is no Suspension Clause
violation if Congress provides an adequate alternative to habeas corpus for
judicial review. 95 One of the more contentious issues that has arisen since the
passage of the REAL ID Act is whether providing circuit courts with
exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law raised
in petitions for review of final orders of removal is an "adequate alternative,"
or whether it violates the Suspension Clause.96 The question of whether
appellate courts are an adequate substitute for habeas is particularly relevant
in the context of claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
provision that limits or eliminates judicial review or jurisdiction to review, the terms
'judicial review' and 'jurisdiction to review' include habeas corpus review pursuant
to section 2241 of title 28... or any other habeas corpus provision ....
Id.
92 H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 173-75 (2005).
93 Gittens v. Menifee, 428 F.3d 382, 383 (2d Cir. 2005). See also Ishak, 422 F.3d at
29 (noting that the REAL ID Act "definitively eliminated any provision for jurisdiction"
in the district courts over habeas petitions challenging final orders of removal); Gelaneh
v. Ashcroft, 153 F. App'x 881, 885 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[The REAL ID Act] expressly
eliminated district courts' habeas jurisdiction over removal orders." (citation omitted)).
94 Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977). Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2
("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
95 151 CONG. REc. H2813, H2873 (daily ed. May 3, 2005). When the REAL ID Act
was passed it was noted that "[n]o alien, not even criminal aliens, will be deprived of
judicial review of such claims. Unlike AEDPA and IIRIRA, which attempted to eliminate
judicial review of criminal aliens' removal orders, section 106 would give every alien one
day in the court of appeals, satisfying constitutional concerns." H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at
174-75. According to the House Report, the REAL ID Act would provide every alien
with a fair opportunity to obtain judicial review. Id.
96 See, e.g., Wahab v. Attorney General, 373 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (suggesting that vesting exclusive jurisdiction in circuit courts amounts to a
"wholesale elimination" of the writ for aliens contesting a removal order). Cf Okeezie v.
Chertoff, 430 F. Supp. 2d 655, 658-59 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (stating that the REAL ID Act
is Congress's attempt to provide a constitutionally adequate alternative to habeas review).
[Vol. 69:557
REAL ID ACT
protection, where appellate courts, unlike district courts, are barred from
engaging in' further fact finding, and the outcome of the case often depends
on the ability of a petitioner to satisfy a heavy evidentiary burden. 97
C. Standard of Judicial Review: The Substantial Evidence Test
This section will briefly discuss the standard or review used by federal
courts to evaluate challenges to a BIA final order of removal in the context of
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. It will
highlight some of the tensions regarding discretionary judgments committed
to executive agencies and judicial review.
As an agency of the Executive Branch, the BIA, according to the
Supreme Court, should be accorded Chevron-like deference as it gives
ambiguous statutory terms "concrete meaning through a process of case-by-
case adjudication." 98 In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre the Supreme Court held that
judicial deference to the Executive Branch is particularly important in the
immigration context where "officials 'exercise especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations."' 99 Thus, recent
Supreme Court decisions have directed circuit courts to accord more
deference to BIA decisions in removal proceedings. 100
Factual determinations made by an Immigration Court and the BIA are
generally reviewed by appellate courts under the "highly deferential
substantial evidence test," which requires a circuit court to "view the record
... in the light most favorable to the [IJ]'s decision and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that decision."' 01 Factual determinations that are
subject to the substantial evidence test include a determination of whether a
97 See infra Part III.A.
98 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citation omitted).
99 Id. (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
100 John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal
Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 606 (2004) (citing
INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre 526 U.S. 415 (1999); INS v.
Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996); and INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992)).
101 Adefmi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 2004). The substantial
evidence standard has its origins in the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides
that a "reviewing court shall.., hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be... (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a
case... reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E) (2000). The "substantial evidence test" was also articulated by the Supreme
Court in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
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petitioner has suffered past persecution, or is likely to suffer future
persecution, 10 2 and the credibility of the applicant.' °3 10
While immigration courts determine whether a deportable alien has
established a likelihood of persecution or torture upon return to their country
of origin, so as to qualify for withholding of removal, a circuit court is
permitted to reverse an immigration court's decision if "the evidence ...
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find
the requisite fear of persecution." 10 4 The substantial evidence standard
requires an appellate court to uphold the findings of the BIA "as long as they
are 'supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole." ' 10 5 A number of circuits have followed this
substantial evidence standard. 10 6
D. Credibility Determinations
Even in the absence of corroboration of past or future persecution, it has
generally been held that the testimony of an applicant is sufficient where the
testimony "is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a
102 Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).'
103 Yu v. Aschcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 703 (6th Cir. 2004).
104 Nakimbugwe v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000)
("[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary."); Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082,
1087 (7th Cir. 2006); Saah v. Gonzales, 201 F. App'x 354, 357 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted) ("[A reviewing] court must uphold the BIA's decision unless it is 'manifestly
contrary to the law."'); Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (en
banc), cert. denied 544 U.S. 1035 (2005) ("[T]he mere fact that the record may support a
contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.").
105 Sanusi v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
106 See, e.g., Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 788-89 (10th Cir. 2007); Nicolas v.
Attorney Gen., 179 F. App'x 641, 643 (11 th Cir. 2006); Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212,
216 (3d Cir. 2005); Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 278 (4th Cir. 2004);
Nyama v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2004). Congress codified the substantial
evidence test as part of IIRIRA, "providing that for judicial review of BIA
determinations, 'administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary."' Michael M. Hethmon,
Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining Reforms and Judicial
Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 999, 1040 (2006) (citation omitted).
IIRIRA "expressly stripped the Article III courts of authority to consider additional
evidence, even material evidence. Elias-Zacarias remains the standard of review used by
the federal courts to define the scope of their review of fact-finding by DHS officials, Us,
and the BIA." Id.
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plausible and coherent account of the basis [for his] fear."'107 Given the
difficulty in verifying an applicant's testimony, an IJ is expected to make "a
reasoned and thorough credibility determination."' 1 8 A credibility analysis
evaluates an applicant's claim for internal consistency, level of detail, and
plausibility. 10 9 An IJ may make an adverse credibility determination based
on inconsistent statements, conflicting evidence, and "inherently improbable
testimony" in light of the background evidence on country conditions.' 10
Since credibility decisions are considered factual findings made by
immigration courts, they are generally reviewed by appellate courts under a
substantial evidence standard.111 While an adverse credibility finding made
by an IJ is accorded substantial deference, the finding "must be supported by
specific reasons," and "[a]ny inconsistencies in an applicant's representations
must 'go to the heart of the applicant's claim' . . .. If discrepancies cannot be
viewed as attempts by the applicant to enhance his claims of persecution,
they have no bearing on credibility."'1 12
Appellate courts have generally circumscribed their scope of review over
an IJ's adverse credibility findings in the context of asylum and withholding
of removal claims because these determinations "require intensive factual
inquiries that appellate courts are ill-suited to conduct.' 1 3 However, it is
precisely in the area of credibility determinations that appellate courts have
directed some of their harshest criticisms at IJs. 114
107 In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 1997). See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(a) (2006) ("The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to
sustain the burden of proof without corroboration."). For an application of this standard,
see In re Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120 (BIA 1989) and Gjerazi v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 800
(7th Cir. 2006).
108 Gjerazi, 435 F.3d at 808.
109 Id.
"01n re S-M-J-, 211. & N. Dec. at 729.
111 Bah v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 2006).
112 Saah v. Gonzales, 201 F. App'x 354, 359 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted);
accord Castafteda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 112, 122 (1st Cir. 2006); Secaida-
Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003). However, the REAL ID Act altered the
degree of deference accorded to immigration judges in making credibility assessments.
See infra Part III.C.
113 Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) (using an
"exceedingly narrow scope of review" for IJ's credibility findings).
114 See infra Part III.
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IV. THE REAL ID ACT
Passed in May 2005 as part of the Emergency -Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
'Relief, the REAL ID Act1 15 was enacted in response to a congressional
concern that non-citizens were exploiting asylum laws, and was designed to
'address what was deemed "a number of judicial review anomalies
-improperly favoring criminal aliens that were created by court decisions
interpreting changes to the INA in 1996." 116 Under the REAL ID Act, circuit
courts are provided with exclusive federal jurisdiction to review
constitutional claims and "questions of law" raised in petitions for review of
final orders of removal issued by the BIA. 117 The purpose of the judicial
review provisions of the Act is to permit judicial review over those issues
that were "historically reviewable on habeas--constitutional and statutory-
construction questions, not discretionary or factual questions."'1 18
While keeping in place a provision in the Immigration and Nationality
Act providing that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any
judgment regarding the granting of relief, or ... [the] authority for which is
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of
[asylum]," 119 the Act provides circuit courts with limited jurisdiction to
review constitutional claims and "questions of law" in petitions for review of
final agency orders of removal. 120 Despite the clarity that the REAL ID Act
115 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1252).
116 H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 172 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 297
(May 3, 2005). See also supra Part II.B.
117 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
118 151 CONG. REc. H2813, H2873 (daily ed. May 3, 2005). The Judiciary
Committee noted that "habeas review does not cover discretionary determinations or
factual issues that do not implicate constitutional due process." 151 CONG. REC. at
H2873. A 'question of law' is a question regarding the construction of a statute." H.R.
REP. No. 109-72, at 175.
119 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). This jurisdiction-stripping provision was put in place
by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, at 3009-597.
120 REAL ID Act, § 106(a)(l)(A)(iii) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).
Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), [subsection B is titled "Denials of discretionary
relief"] or in any other provision of this Act (other than this section) which limits or
eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate
court of appeals in accordance with this section.
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was intended to bring to the boundaries of federal court jurisdiction over
final orders of removal, the precise meaning of "question of law" has been
subject to countless interpretive debates.121
A. Uncertainty Regarding the Precise Meaning of
"A Question of Law"
Some circuits have narrowly defined the term "question of law."'122
While appellate courts have been in general agreement that challenges
directed exclusively at an Immigration Court's discretionary and factual
determinations are outside the scope of judicial review, 123 circuit courts have
been inconsistent in defining the types of decisions that are discretionary.' 24
Id. Thus, following the enactment of the REAL ID Act, appellate courts were confronted
with the question of what effect 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) had on a circuit court's
authority to review discretionary determinations made by the BIA, such as those falling
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), pertaining to cancellation of removal. Martinez v.
Attorney General, 446 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11 th Cir. 2006).
121 See, e.g., Xiao Ji Chen v. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting that the term "question of law" provides "no guidance as to the precise content of
that phrase"); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16-17, Lopez-Cancinos v. Gonzales, 127
S. Ct. 2127 (2007) (No. 06-740), 2006 WL 3423868 (noting that since the passage of the
REAL ID Act circuit courts have struggled to define the term "questions of law,"
resulting in "inconsistent decisions between and within circuits"). Left unresolved is
whether questions of law includes the application of law to undisputed facts. See also
Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitution's Most Important Human Right:
Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID Act, 106 COLuM. L. REv. 1367,
1368 (2006) ("Since many questions in immigration law are neither purely factual nor
purely legal, but mixed, this omission poses a significant challenge for circuit courts
determining the scope of their jurisdiction to review non-citizens' appeals under REAL
ID.").
122 See, e.g., Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 419 (4th Cir. 2006) ("The REAL ID
Act confers upon courts of appeal a narrowly circumscribed jurisdiction to resolve
constitutional claims or questions of law raised by aliens seeking discretionary relief.");
Kamara v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding an appellate court
is limited to reviewing "pure questions of law" and to "issues of application of law to
fact, where the facts are undisputed and not the subject of challenge") (citation omitted).
123 See, e.g., Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir. 2006); Hadwani v.
Gonzales, 445 F.3d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 2006); Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 877 (8th
Cir. 2005); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2005).
124 For instance, the INA provides that the Attorney General, in his discretion, may
adjust the status of an alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2000). The Seventh Circuit found that it
has jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions denying adjustment of status. Hamdan
v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1058 (7th Cir. 2005). The Fourth Circuit, however, has held
that it lacks jurisdiction to review an immigration judge's denial of adjustment of status.
Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 2006).
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Several circuits have held that although it permits "discretionary denials of
relief," 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) "does not bar judicial review of rulings that are
not discretionary in character."' 125 The Third Circuit has noted that:
[t]he jurisdiction-stripping language of [the REAL ID Act] applies not to all
decisions the Attorney General is entitled to make but to a narrower
category of decisions where Congress has taken the additional step to
specify that the sole authority for the action is in the Attorney General's
discretion. Put another way, the Attorney General's general authority to
arrive at an outcome through the application of law to facts is distinct from
the issue of whether Congress has 'specified' that the decision lies in the
Attorney General's discretion and is thus unreviewable. 12 6
The Seventh Circuit has correctly acknowledged the lack of clarity
inherent in the jurisdictional provisions of the REAL ID Act, noting that
"while the purpose of the door-closing statute appears to be to place
discretionary rulings beyond the power of judicial review ... the statute
itself, read literally, goes further and places all rulings other than those
resolving questions of law or constitutional issues beyond the power of
judicial review." 127
The inability of appellate courts to determine clearly those discretionary
judgments that fall within the category of a "question of law" has not only
produced inconsistent results among circuit courts in relief from removal
cases, but has also limited the degree of judicial review over removal
decisions. 128 This Note, however, will focus on the inconsistencies as they
pertain to petitioners seeking relief from removal in the form of asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. The REAL ID Act
altered the standard governing credibility determinations and the need for
corroboration for petitioners seeking relief in such cases. 129
125 Cevilla v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2006) (referring also to Ibarra-
Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 2006)).
126 Alaka v. Attorney General, 456 F.3d 88, 95-96 (3d Cir. 2006).
127 Cevilla v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2006).
128 For an empirical analysis of this conflict, see Kanstroom, supra note 34, at 192-
93. Kanstroom found that "[o]f all the [circuit court] cases that discussed jurisdiction
specifically, 64.86% (179 of 276) found that the courts lacked jurisdiction to review the
appeal." Id. at 192. "Before the REAL ID Act, 65.5% (161 of 246) of all cases were
jurisdictionally precluded," but following the REAL ID Act, 60% (18 of 30) were
judicially precluded. Further, "54.39% of district court decisions, pre and post-REAL ID,
found jurisdiction lacking. At the circuit court level the percentage of jurisdictional
preclusions was higher: 67.89%." Id. at 193.
129 Dhima v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 92, 95 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005).
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The following sections will examine how appellate courts have been
inconsistent -in applying the REAL ID Act's credibility and corroboration
standards and will demonstrate how the Act has had the effect of restricting
the scope of judicial review over immigration court decisions. Section B will
first discuss how, by narrowly defining what falls within "a question of law,"
appellate courts have foreclosed the ability of petitioners suffering from
improper evidentiary decisions made by immigration courts to seek review in
federal courts. The Act effectively bars many important evidentiary issues
pertaining to proof of persecution from the scope of federal court
jurisdiction.
B. Evidentiary Claims
In the context of claims for withholding of removal, asylum, and CAT
protection, proof of the persecution is crucial. Petitioners seeking to prove
past persecution "must satisfy a heavy evidentiary burden."'130 Asylum
hearings in particular depend on "narrow and specific factual findings. 1 31 A
considerable amount of criticism has been directed at IJs for making mistakes
in reviewing evidence proffered by a petitioner to prove persecution. 132 At
the same time, however, a number of appellate courts have held that they are
precluded from reviewing a determination made by an immigration court
regarding a petitioner's failure to sustain the burden of proof for establishing
persecution. 133 A claim that an IJ has "abused his discretion" by "incorrectly
130 Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2007).
131 Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 219 (3d Cir. 2005). See also Yang v. Attorney
General, 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("The weaker an applicant's testimony,
... the greater the need for corroborative evidence.").
132 See, e.g., Toure v. Attorney General, 443 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating
that there is "no logical or evidentiary basis for the IJ's conclusion that [the petitioner]
was not persecuted on account of one of the statutorily-enumerated grounds");
Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 120-21 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the BIA
focused too narrowly on parts of the record that supported its decision, raised "too high
the bar for an asylum claimant seeking to prove past persecution," and erred by focusing
only on the applicant's oral testimony).
133 See, e.g., Jimenez v. Gonzales, 215 F. App'x 8, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that it
lacked "jurisdiction over petitioner's claims that the IJ erred in denying withholding of
removal or relief under CAT" when the petitioner argued that the IJ "erred in determining
that he had failed to show that it was likely that he would be persecuted because of any of
the five protected grounds, or tortured" according to CAT). A claim that an J's
determinations were "against the weight of evidence" does not present a question of law.
Id. See also Donastrong-Martinez v. Attorney General, 213 F. App'x 107, 111-12 (3d
Cir. 2007) (holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a claim that an IJ erred in making
factual findings and in weighing favorable and adverse factors); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417
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weigh[ing] the evidence, fail[ing] to explicitly consider certain evidence, [or]
simply reach[ing] the wrong outcome" does not itself establish a "colorable
constitutional claim[]."' 134 A claim that an IJ erred in evaluating testimony
would also likely be deemed outside the scope of federal court
jurisdiction. 135 Appellate courts have asserted that if a petitioner has not
challenged a legal standard, an appellate court is precluded from reviewing
the claim. 136 This section will explain how limiting judicial review of
evidentiary issues has had unfair consequences for deportable aliens in cases
where the administrative record is incomplete or where new country
conditions develop.
1. The Existence of Changed Country Conditions
Petitions for asylum must be filed within one year of the alien's arrival in
the United States. 137 The BIA may consider an untimely application if the
applicant demonstrates either the existence of "changed circumstances which
affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum" or "extraordinary circumstances"
F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an IJ's denial
of CAT relief because the issue came down to whether the immigration judge "correctly
considered, interpreted, and weighed the evidence presented"); Nnani v. Attorney
General, 143 F. App'x 249, 252 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (holding that it lacked jurisdiction to
review a claim involving evidentiary issues, even though the IJ "erred by placing too
much weight" on the alien's testimony and failing to fully consider the U.S. State
Department Country Reports). The court in Nnani also found that "[t]o the extent she
challenges factual findings or credibility determinations, made at the administrative level
by the IJ, or the IJ's rulings on admissibility and probative value, we do not have
jurisdiction to grant review .... Id.
134 Saloum v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 244 (2d Cir.
2006).
135 See, e.g., Bugayong v. INS, 442 F.3d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that,
notwithstanding the REAL ID Act, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for
review because the petitioner's argument that the IJ erred in evaluating his hearing
testimony was a challenge to the H's discretion).
136 See, e.g., Caramat-Padilla v. Gonzales, 220 F. App'x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that an appellate court is jurisdictionally barred from reviewing a claim that an
IJ erred in finding that a petitioner "did not establish it was 'more likely than not' that he
would be tortured" because it was a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, not a
challenge to the legal standard used by the I); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 943 (6th
Cir. 2006) (holding that in the context a claim for relief under CAT, its jurisdiction is
limited to whether the BIA used the correct standard and burden of proof in reviewing the
IJ's decision).
137 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000).
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related to the delay in filing an application within the one year time limit.138
While prior to the REAL ID Act federal courts were precluded from
reviewing any determination pertaining to the one-year asylum bar, 39
following the REAL ID Act, circuit courts were forced to answer whether
this fell within a question of law category. 140
A number of circuits have found that a determination by the BIA that a
petitioner failed to demonstrate the existence of changed country conditions
or extraordinary circumstances is not a question of law. 141 Appellate courts,
however, have not been in agreement on whether this operates as an absolute
bar on their ability to review any claims involving changed country
conditions. While the Eleventh Circuit has held that, regardless of whether a
deportable alien's application was timely or whether extraordinary
circumstances existed, it lacks jurisdiction to review a denial of asylum on
those grounds, 142 the Ninth Circuit has held that in certain cases it has
jurisdiction to review a challenge to the IJ's determination that a petitioner
failed to show changed circumstances to excuse the untimely filing of an
asylum application. 143
138 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(B) (2007) (such
changes may include "activities the applicant becomes involved in outside the country of
feared persecution that place the applicant at risk").
139 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) ("No court shall have jurisdiction to review any
determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2) [of 8 USC § 1158(a)].").
140 Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2005), aff'd 479 F.3d
646 (9th Cir. 2007), reh g and reh g en banc denied sub nom. Ramadan v. Keisler, 504
F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2007).
141 See, e.g., Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1086 (7th Cir. 2006); Chahid
Hayek v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 501, 506-07 (1st Cir. 2006); Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216,
218 (2d Cir. 2006).
142 Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (1 1th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has
also held that
[i]f an application is deemed untimely under the one-year limit or the exceptions
then the statute provides that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any
determination of the Attorney General ...." We have previously held that this statutory
language "is sufficiently specific to show that Congress intended to preclude judicial
review of agency action under § 1158(a)(2)."
Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1086 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)
and Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2004)).
143 Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 654-56 (9th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit
has similarly noted that "not all changed circumstances cases are necessarily
'predominantly factual."' Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 924 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006)
(noting that in Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2006), the court
held that it "did not have jurisdiction over the petitioner's claim of 'changed
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Precluding appellate courts from reviewing claims that a petitioner failed
to demonstrate "changed circumstances" can have unfair consequences for
deportable aliens seeking relief from a legitimate fear of persecution.
Conditions in a petitioner's country of origin often change between the
period in which the BLA renders its decision and the time in which an
appellate court considers the petition for review, such that there is no longer
a basis for the alien's claim of persecution in the country of removal.144 The
country reports in the administrative record that are used to corroborate
claims of persecution are frequently a few years old by the time the petition
for review reaches an appellate court, and often fail to accurately reflect
current conditions in the country of removal. 145 Despite the problem of
"stale" administrative records, appellate courts are limited to considering
only the record developed by an immigration court and are generally barred
from engaging in further fact finding. 146
circumstances' because it involved a 'predominantly factual determination"' (citation
omitted)).
144 See, e.g., Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[E]ven taking
[the petitioner's] testimony as true, country conditions in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia had changed such that [the petitioner] could no longer have a well-founded
fear of future persecution.").
145 Id. at 329.
146 Id. at 328-29 ("It is a salutary principle of administrative law review that the
reviewing court act upon a closed record. [Though this] yields good results in most cases,
in the area of asylum, where claims are heavily dependent on country conditions, it can
become an albatross."). See also Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting a petitioner's argument that the Immigration Judge "abused its discretion in not
receiving further evidence regarding ... changed circumstances by prematurely
pretermitting [his] asylum application" because the question of whether to admit or not to
admit certain evidence is outside the jurisdiction of an appellate court); Cela v. Gonzales,
205 F. App'x 376 (6th Cir. 2006) (defining the scope of review as "the administrative
record on which the order of removal is based" (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4))); Hanan
v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 834, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that it is unable to review the
"country reports from the years following the IJ's decision to deny him relief" because it
is not part of the administrative record, despite showing a likelihood for torture); Kamara
v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[W]hile the use of stale country
reports is particularly problematic and may lead sometimes to absurd or unjust results,
'courts reviewing the determination of an administrative agency must approve or reject
the agency's action purely on the basis of the reasons offered by, and the record compiled




2. Remanding to the Agency
Prior to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, an appellate court had authority to remand cases
to the BIA under 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c). 147 This statutory provision permits a
party seeking relief from removal "to seek 'leave to adduce additional
evidence' from the court of appeals in a proceeding reviewing an
administrative agency decision if that evidence is material and reasonably
unavailable previously" and "also permits a court of appeals to 'order the
additional evidence and any counterevidence' a party desires to be taken
into account by the agency. 148 Following the passage of IIRIRA, § 2347(c)
no longer permits an appellate court to order the BIA to consider additional
evidence that is offered for the first time on appeal. 149
Despite this statutory bar, the Supreme Court has set forth an "ordinary
remand rule." In INS v. Ventura, the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision
holding that a Guatemalan citizen had met his burden of proving the
existence of past persecution, even though the immigration judge and the
BIA had failed to address the question of past persecution. 150 The Ninth
Circuit, according to the Court, had erred by deciding the issue without first
providing the BIA with the opportunity to address the issue. 151 Under the
ordinary remand rule, a court of appeals is generally precluded from
conducting a de novo inquiry into the matter under review and reaching its
own conclusions; instead, the proper procedure is to remand to the agency for
further investigation or explanation. 152 This "ordinary remand rule" was
recently invoked by the Court in Gonzales v. Thomas, where the Court
reversed and remanded a Ninth Circuit decision holding that the petitioner
was persecuted on account of his membership in a social group because the
agency has not yet considered whether petitioner's family qualified as a
"particular social group."'153
Appellate courts, however, have been unclear on when it is permissible
to remand to an immigration court. Certain circuits have been reluctant to
147 Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 473 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Osagahe v.
INS, 942 F.2d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1991)).
148 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (2000)).
149 Id. (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2000) which provides that a court reviewing
a final order of removal "may not order the taking of additional evidence under section
2347(c)").
150 537 U.S. 12, 14 (2002).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006).
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remand to an immigration court for additional fact finding. 154 The Second
Circuit has suggested that, while it lacks statutory authority to grant a motion
to remand, it possesses "inherent equitable power" to remand to the BIA. 155
However, in a subsequent opinion, the Second Circuit stated that the exercise
of such an inherent power is not warranted if the basis for the remand is an
instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record
before the BIA and agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case
before the BIA for the taking of additional evidence. 156
Limiting the authority of an appellate court to remand to an agency is
problematic for petitioners since the credibility and corroboration standards
of the REAL ID Act have restricted the scope of judicial review. As with the
issue of remanding, appellate courts have been similarly inconsistent in
applying the credibility and corroboration standards of the REAL ID Act.
154 See, e.g., Thomas v. Attorney General, 210 F. App'x 195, 202 (3d Cir. 2006)
(holding that it lacked jurisdiction to remand to the BIA for additional fact finding even
though the petitioner claimed that in the four and one-half year period between his
hearing before the IJ and the appellate court's review of the administrative record,
significant political changes had occurred in Haiti which had worsened human rights
conditions). The Third Circuit noted that while remand is permissible under normal
administrative review, in immigration cases, it is barred from remanding to the agency
for further fact finding and "may not order the taking of additional evidence under ......
Id. Cf Liang v. Gonzales, 217 F. App'x 692, 693 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that because
neither the Immigration Judge nor the BIA addressed whether the petitioner established a
well-founded fear of persecution warranting asylum, remand is appropriate in light of
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) and INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002));
Saavedra De Barreto v. INS, 427 F. Supp. 2d 51, 61 (D. Conn. 2006) (noting that "even if
the [administrative] record is not sufficiently developed, ... the courts of appeals could
conduct their own fact-finding or at least remand" to the Immigration Court or BIA for
additional fact-finding). See also Lin, 473 F.3d at 53 (holding that IIRIRA eliminated its
authority under § 2347(c) to remand to the BIA so the alien can present additional
evidence). But see Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 261-62 (2d Cir. 2007).
155 Lin, 473 F.3d at 52. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to
consider new documentary evidence on forced sterilization practices in the Fujan
province of China. Id. See also Xiao Xing Ni, 494 F.3d at 261-62. These two decisions
were a departure from other circuits. See, e.g., Gebremaria v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 734, 737
(8th Cir. 2004) (declining to supplement the record on appeal with an affidavit from a
family member). In Lin, the Second Circuit noted that although it agrees with other
circuits that IIRIRA eliminated its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2347 to remand to the
Board so that an alien can produce additional evidence, it disagrees with other circuits
that an appellate court lacks "any other power to remand." Lin, 473 F.3d at 53-54.
156 Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 269 (2d Cir. 2007).
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C. The Credibility of the Applicant and Corroboration of Claims
The REAL ID Act was enacted in part because
[a]s there are no explicit evidentiary standards for granting asylum in the
INA, standards for determining the credibility of an asylum applicant and
the necessity for evidence corroborating an applicant's testimony have
evolved through the case law of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
and federal courts. Because these standards are not consistent across federal
appellate courts, different results have been reached in similar cases,
depending on the court that hears the case. 157
However, rather than achieve greater consistency in removal decisions,
the REAL ID Act's corroboration and credibility provisions have the effect
of restricting the scope of review by federal courts in relief from removal
cases and enhancing the discretionary authority of IJs.
This section will discuss how the credibility and corroboration provisions
have had the effect of restricting judicial review over final orders of removal.
It will also discuss how appellate courts have been inconsistent in applying
the corroboration standard of the REAL ID Act.
1. Credibility Determinations
Prior to the REAL ID Act, when an IJ determined that a petitioner's
testimony lacked credibility, the IJ was to include in his or her decision
specific reasons for reaching such a conclusion.158 An adverse credibility
finding was to be "based on issues that go to the heart of the applicant's
claim."' 159 The REAL ID Act limits the scope of judicial review over an IJ's
credibility determinations by providing that those determinations may be
made "without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
goes to the heart of the applicant's claim." 160 The Act provides that
a trier of fact [an IJ] may base a credibility determination on the demeanor,
candor, or responsiveness of the applicant's or witness's account, the
consistency between the applicant or witness's written and oral statements
157 H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 161 (2005) (Conference Report).
158 Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2006).
159 See id. (citation omitted); Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2006).
160 Pub. L. 109-13, § 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000)).
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... the internal consistency of each such statement ... the consistency of
such statements with other evidence of the record .... 161
No presumption of credibility exists; however, if no credibility
determination is explicitly made, the applicant "shall have a rebuttable
presumption of credibility on appeal."1 62
Following the REAL ID Act, issues addressed by circuit courts in the
past and "often leading to favorable outcomes for asylum claimants are no
longer subject to review." 163 In In re S-B-, a petitioner appealed to the BIA
an IJ's ruling that invoked the credibility standards set forth in the REAL ID
Act. 164 The U based his adverse credibility finding on events "tangential" to
the respondent's claim to mistreatment in Guinea, his country of origin,165
such as a discrepancy between the respondent's statement that he arrived at
JFK airport, and his witness's statement that he arrived at Newark airport,
and a "purported discrepancy" between the respondent's account of arrests in
Guinea-Bissau and the Department of State's account of favorable treatment
of refugees in Guinea-Bissau. 166 The IJ also based his adverse credibility
determination on the petitioner's omission of any reference to the death of
his father in his asylum application, which the IJ found significant given the
respondent's testimony that his father had been imprisoned and killed on
account of his political activities. 167 In making his credibility assessment in
this case, the IJ relied on the REAL ID Act, contending that he could give
161 Id
162 Id. § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii). The new credibility provisions are a significant departure
from previous case law. See, e.g., Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir.
2003) ("An applicant's failure to list in his or her initial application [for asylum and
withholding of removal] facts that emerge later in testimony will not automatically
provide a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility finding."); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d
266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that minor discrepancies that do not involve the "heart of
the asylum claim" are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding); Campos-
Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999) (.'[I]nconsistencies of less than
substantial importance for which a plausible explanation is offered' cannot form the sole
basis for an adverse credibility finding.") (citation omitted).
163 Jill A. Apa & Sophie I. Feal, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back. The Future of
Credibility Findings by Circuit Courts in Asylum Cases Under the REAL ID Act of 2005,
11 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 376 (2006).
164 24 I. & N. Dec. 42 (BIA 2006).
16 5 Id, at 45.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 45 n.5. In his asylum application, the respondent checked a box indicating
that his father was "deceased," with the explanatory note, "in jail." Id.
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consideration to inconsistencies and omissions, whether or not they go to the
heart of the claim. 168
The new credibility requirements set forth in the REAL ID Act create the
potential for abuse since IJs have often denied requests for relief from
removal based on minor inconsistencies.1 69 A Ninth Circuit case, Jibril v.
Gonzales, aptly illustrates this problem. Jibril was a member of a minority
clan in Somalia and applied for asylum in the United States. 170 The IJ found
that Jibril's testimony was not credible because of an apparent inconsistency
between Jibril's statement that he was pretending to be dead when members
of the United Somali Congress militia raided his house, and his statement
that he was able to see the types of weapons the soldiers were carrying. 171
The IJ also found it "implausible that Jibril could have remained
unresponsive while being kicked in the head, that Jibril could have survived a
gunshot wound," and that Jibril's "demeanor in testifying showed much
evasiveness." 172 While the Ninth Circuit remanded the case because the
petition was filed prior to when the REAL ID Act went into effect, it noted
168 Id. at 46. The BIA noted that this was inconsistent with the law of the Sixth
Circuit, the controlling jurisdiction in the case, holding that an I's adverse credibility
determination must be based on issues that go to the "heart of the applicant's claim." Id.
While the BIA remanded for further findings using Sixth Circuit standards, this was done
only because the Board found that the application was filed with an asylum officer prior
to the passage of the REAL ID Act. Id. at 45-46. Had the REAL ID Act applied, the BIA
most likely would have affirmed the U's opinion.
169 See, e.g., Bao v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 426, 431 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that
the U denied the asylum application on adverse credibility grounds based on
discrepancies between applicant's testimony and her husband's independent asylum
application and interview); Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting
that the IJ made an adverse credibility determination based on perceived inconsistencies
in the applicant's statements, although the appellate court noted that this was merely the
result of a translation error); Dawoud v. Refaat, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005)
(observing that U found petitioner not credible "because of the 'swiftness' with which he
obtained his passport and travel visa"); Vasha v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 863, 869 (6th Cir.
2005) (overturning IJ's finding that asylum applicant was inconsistent in his testimony;
according to appellate court, because the implausibilities identified by the IJ had no basis
in the record and the omissions were not substantially related to the asylum claim);
Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 120-21 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that the I
improperly focused on applicant's oral testimony in rejecting her claim of persecution
when the affidavit was replete with information).
170 Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005).
171 Id. at 1134.
172 Id. at 1136-37.
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that were the REAL ID Act to apply to Jibril's petition, the court would be
obliged to deny his petition. 173
This marks a considerable departure from appellate court deqisions prior
to the REAL ID Act where a circuit court would generally affirm an adverse
credibility determination only where it was "supported by 'specific cogent
reasons' that 'bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.""' 174 While an appellate
court would accord deference to an IJ's credibility determination, adverse
credibility determinations were not to be "grounded in trivial details or easily
explained discrepancies [that lack a] 'legitimate nexus to the finding."' 75
Limitations on judicial review of an IJ's credibility determination is
troubling because, while appellate courts have permitted IJs to base adverse
credibility determinations on inconsistencies, many of these inconsistencies
are not the result of a petitioner making false assertions about the likelihood
that they would be persecuted if returned to their country of origin.' 76
2. Corroborating Claims of Persecution
The REAL ID Act's corroboration provisions also have the effect of
limiting judicial review over relief from removal cases and have produced
inconsistent decisions with respect to the corroboration standards. The Act
provides that "[no] court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact
[IJ] with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence ... unless the
court finds ... that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that
such corroborating evidence is unavailable."' 77 The REAL ID Act permits an
173 Id. at 1138 n. 1 ("His demeanor and any inaccuracies in his statements, without
regard to whether they go to the heart of his claim, would all be valid bases for the IJ's
adverse credibility determination.... Such high deference is what the law requires today,
though in this case, and in the thousands of other petitions filed before the effective date
of the Act, our precedent frustrates its expression.").
174 Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Accord Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 623 (6th Cir. 2004); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299
F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2002); Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
175 Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 387 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
176 See, e.g., Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 112, 114 n.6 (1st Cir. 2006)
(finding some of the supposed inconsistencies in the applicant's testimony were the result
of faulty translations); Pergega v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 623, 630 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
errors in the translation of an affidavit contributed to perceived inconsistencies in the
petitioner's testimony).
177 Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 305 (2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)). Prior to the REAL ID Act the standard for corroboration was: "[tihe
testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof
without corroboration." 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b) (2005).
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IJ to require an otherwise credible applicant "to provide corroborating
evidence in certain circumstances."' 178
Appellate courts have been inconsistent and unclear in applying the
REAL ID Act's corroboration standards. For instance, in Zhang v. Gonzales,
the Seventh Circuit noted that the REAL ID Act requires only that an IJ's
determination that an alien should provide corroborating evidence to
supplement the alien's testimony is entitled to "reasonable deference."' 179
Zhang's claim to political asylum and withholding of deportation was based
on his opposition to China's forced family-planning regulations and his
experience as a victim of that policy in China.180 An U denied his request for
asylum on grounds that Zhang had failed to provide corroborating evidence,
such as a hospital record, indicating that his wife was subject to a forced
abortion, 181 and evidence that he was married. 182 The Zhang court vacated
the IJ's denial of withholding of removal and asylum, 183 in part because the
IJ's demand for corroborating evidence was "unsubstantiated" and
"implausible."1 84
On similar facts, in Chen v. Gonzales, the Third Circuit upheld a BIA
decision denying an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT protection on grounds that the petitioner's claim that she was
persecuted because she was subject to a forced abortion was insufficiently
corroborated. 185 Applying the REAL ID Act's standard of review on
corroboration, the court in Chen stated, "There is nothing in the record to
suggest that a reasonable trier of fact would be compelled to conclude that
178 San Kai Kwok v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir: 2006) (citation omitted).
See also Jared Joyce-Schleimer, Developments in the Legislative Branch: The State of the
REAL ID Act of 2005, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 612 (2005) (stating the REAL ID Act
"constricts judicial review of IJs' determinations .... [T]hus [the Act] establish[es] a
deferential factual review standard where previously there was no set standard").
179 434 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) ("The precondition to
deference is that the immigration judge explain.., why he thinks corroborating evidence,
if it existed, would have been available to the alien.... [A] determination of availability
must rest on more than implausible assertions backed up by no facts."). See also Hor v.
Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 500-01 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the IJ's demand for
corroboration of an alien's account of abuse in the form of affidavits by co-workers,
because the U gave no explanation for thinking the co-workers would provide such
affidavits in light of the murderous nature of the group involved).
180 Zhang, 434 F.3d at 995.
181 Id. at 996-97.
182 Id. at 998.
183 Id. at 1002.
184 Id. at 999.
185 434 F.3d 212, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2005).
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corroborating evidence is unavailable."' 186  The petitioner's only
corroboration was a document that she referred to as an abortion certificate
and an unswom affidavit from her father who was still in China, stating that
Chen had been "seized by 'village cadres"' from her aunt's home and taken
to the hospital where she was forced to undergo an abortion. 187  ..
Although the country reports that the IJ considered in Chen indicated that
the practice of coercing women to have an abortion still occurs, the Third
Circuit upheld the IJ's conclusion that since the abortion certificate was not
authenticated, it was not adequate proof of a forced abortion.1 88 While the
Seventh Circuit in Zhang found it unreasonable to expect corroboration in
cases of forced abortions, 189 the Third Circuit applying the corroboration
standard of the REAL ID Act has held that it is reasonable for an IJ to
demand that a petitioner provide corroborating evidence to prove forced
sterilization. 190
Restricting the degree of judicial review over an IJ's corroboration
determinations is troubling because circuit courts frequently find that IJs
request documentation that is "irrelevant" or "unavailable."' 9 1 Moreover,
corroborating asylum claims is often not feasible, particularly since "[m]ost
asylum seekers will not come to court equipped with notarized affidavits
from their persecutors stating, 'I Joe Persecutor, beat and tortured your client
186 Id. at 220 (citation omitted).
187 Id. at 218.
188 Id. at 218-19.
189 See Zhang, 434 F.3d at 999-1000.
190 See Zheng v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 379, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2005). However, in a case
where the petitioner had provided the immigration judge with an abortion certificate as
corroboration, the Third Circuit, invoking the REAL ID Act's corroboration standards,
upheld the IJ's denial of petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the CAT based on insufficient corroboration. Ding v. Attorney General, 193
F. App'x 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2006).
191 Tebo, supra note 21, at 39. See also Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627,
636 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The IJ refused to give any weight to unauthenticated documentary
evidence, [where] the evidence, if genuine, would have corroborated the petitioner's
testimony."); Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that it was
unreasonable for the IJ to expect a Guinean asylum applicant to provide documents from
the opposition political party and from newspapers about a demonstration the newspaper
might not have reported); Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 832-33 (7th Cir. 2005)
(noting that the BIA ordered an alien deported "because he failed to produce a document
that was ... peripheral to his claim"); Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 122 (1st
Cir. 2004) (noting that "the record does not support BIA's conclusion that [the petitioner]




on three occasions.., on account of her political opinion .... "',192 A lack of
corroborating documents did not pose as severe a problem for deportable
aliens prior to the REAL ID Act. Under the pre-REAL ID Act standard, an IJ
who denied an asylum claim for lack of corroboration was expected to first
make an express credibility finding and explain why it is reasonable to
expect corroboration; an U, most importantly, was not to "require an
applicant to submit irrelevant corroborating evidence." 193 Under the REAL
ID Act, an IJ is permitted to require corroboration even if he determines the
applicant is credible.194
V. ACHIEVING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE: JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Conflicting tensions inhere in judicial review of final orders of removal.
On the one hand, a certain amount of agency discretion is desirable in order
to limit the caseload of immigration appeals in federal courts; "'questions of
law' could not have been intended to expand [appellate courts'] jurisdiction
192 Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real ID Act
is a False Promise, 43 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 122 (2006) ("[M]any asylum seekers
arrive from countries that lack ... adequate communication systems, and... functioning
govemment[s]."). Obtaining documents such as a birth certificate or medical report
involve logistical impediments. Id. Often, the more legitimate the persecution, the less
likely it is that the asylum seeker will have the required proof. Id. In removal
proceedings, a petitioner is further removed from the alleged persecution than an alien
who enters the United States and then requests asylum because many of them have been
in the United States for several years. In Thomas v. Attorney General, for instance, the
Third Circuit stated that
[a]lthough we agree that [petitioner] has not established the likelihood of torture
under our precedent, we nevertheless hasten to add a note of caution insofar as the
BIA seems to have expected documentary evidence of threats against [petitioner] by
Haitian drug dealers. It is highly unlikely that drug dealers, or those associated with
them, would generate documentary evidence of illegal activity or threats of revenge
against someone who has cooperated with the government. The BIA did not
elaborate upon the kind of documentary evidence [petitioner] might reasonably be
expected to have of any such threats ....
210 F. App'x 195, 199 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Gjerazi v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 800,
809 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Contrary to the U's reasoning ... it seems illogical to require a
family fleeing a country to ... collect documents in order to corroborate an asylum
claim.").
193 San Kai Kwok v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2006).
194 KURZBAN, supra note 13, at 435.
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in such a boundless fashion."'195 On the other hand, "granting deference to
administrative tribunals does not mean we have clothed their rulings with
that kind of power expressed in the maxim the 'king can do no wrong." ' 196
Admittedly, the REAL ID Act was an attempt to achieve such a balance,
reflecting a congressional intent "to streamline immigration proceedings and
to expedite removal while restoring judicial review of constitutional and
legal issues." 197
As this Note has demonstrated, the REAL ID Act has failed to achieve
this. This Part will provide suggestions for reducing the high volume of
immigration appeals in circuit courts, while also ensuring that deportable
aliens are provided with fair removal proceedings that comport with
requirements of procedural due process. These solutions include: reinstating
district court review, changes at the immigration court level, and a new
standard of judicial review that takes into account the distinct purpose and
function of immigration courts.
A. Reinstating District Court Review
One solution to reducing the high volume of immigration cases in circuit
courts is reinstating district court review of final orders of removal, a
procedure that was in place prior to the passage of the REAL ID Act. Since
the federal district courts have been essentially stripped of any authority to
review immigration cases, the circuit courts are currently overloaded with
immigration appeals. 198 It has been further noted by one federal district court
that circuit courts are an "inadequate" forum for judicial review of an agency
determination because "it effectively bars these litigants from receiving an
evidentiary hearing." 199
195 Xiao Ji Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2006), reh'g granted, 471
F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that "questions of law" does not mean all questions
having a legal dimension because the section only covers certain legal claims). See also
Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 2006) ("We are not free to convert every
immigration case into a question of law, and thereby undermine Congress's decision to
grant limited jurisdiction over matters committed in the first instance to the sound
discretion of the Executive.").
196 Fessehaye v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
197 Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2005).
198 Apa & Feal, supra note 167, at 376. While district courts still retain jurisdiction
over immigration matters that are independent of removal, a large volume of immigration
appeals are challenges to final orders of removal. Benson, supra note 19, at 42-43. See,
e.g., Channer v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 406 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (D. Conn. 2005).
199 Wahab v. Attorney General, 373 F. Supp. 2d 524, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (noting
that since a reviewing court is to decide the petition only on the administrative record,
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Prior to the passage of the REAL ID Act, the habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2243 (2000), permitted aliens "to proffer evidence at an evidentiary
hearing, enabling a judge to make factual findings." 200 Appellate courts
however, are not permitted to engage in factual developments but are
expected to be limited in their review to the administrative record.20'
Reinstating district court review would provide more meaningful review of
deportation proceedings than the current congressional proposal to limit all
immigration appeals to a single circuit court.20 2
B. Basic Changes at the Immigration Court Level
It has been noted by Judge Posner that "disturbing features" of the
handling of cases by immigration judges include a lack of familiarity with
foreign cultures, insensitivity to misinterpretation caused by the use of
translators, and insensitivity to the difficulty of making a credibility
determination on the deportment of a person from a foreign culture.203 In
defense of the judges, the National Association of Immigration Judges
attributes poor decisions to a lack of resources, a high volume of cases, and
aliens are deprived of the ability to present evidence at a hearing). See also Brempong v.
Chertoff, No. Civ. 305CV733PCD, 2006 WL 618106 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2006)
(practitioner arguing that the REAL ID Act may provide an inadequate substitute forum
because it bars aliens contesting removal from receiving an evidentiary hearing).
200 Wahab, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25. See also Hafetz, supra note 58, at 2534-35
(discussing common law habeas and noting that judges were not precluded from
reviewing facts in habeas).
201 See Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2005).
202 While the Senate Judiciary Committee contends that designating a single court to
handle all appeals from immigration courts would provide a uniform standard for
immigration decisions and discourage immigrants from "shopping for favorable courts,"
critics argue that the D.C. Circuit Court lacks the expertise to handle complex
immigration cases. Swains, supra note 17. Designating one court to handle all
immigration cases is also problematic according to critics because "federal law evolves in
large part based on 'circuit splits,' differences in rulings among appellate courts, which
the Supreme Court resolves." Editorial, supra note 20. One court hearing all immigration
appeals would possess "inordinate power" to make immigration law. Id.
203 lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2005). See also Toure v.
Attorney General, 443 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The H's ... conclusion that Cote
d'Ivoire's civil conflict is not regional or ethnic in nature-is contrary to every official
account of Cote d'Ivoire's civil war, as well as [the petitioner's] testimony .... Nothing
in [his] testimony supports the U's conclusion that he was not persecuted on account of
some combination of his ethnicity, religion, political opinion and imputed political
opinion.").
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increased pressure to resolve cases quickly. 204 Former Attorney General
Gonzales's proposal to institute performance evaluations and hire more
immigration judges, 20 5 while a step in the right direction, is not sufficient. 20 6
Additional funding should be allocated to immigration courts to increase the
number of immigration judges and improve the quality of translators present
at immigration hearings.20 7 In addition to the proposals offered by Gonzales,
the possibility of ending summary affirmances should also be considered.
C. Eliminating Affirmances Without Opinion (A WOs)
In response to what was deemed "an enormous and unprecedented"
increase in the number of appeals to the BIA, the INS promulgated
regulations in 1999 to streamline administrative appeals of immigration court
decisions. 20 8 Prior to the adoption of the streamlining regulations, a three-
judge BIA panel would review an IJ's decision, but the 1999 regulations
authorized a single BIA member to affirm an IJ's decision without issuing an
opinion-something referred to as Affirmances Without Opinion (AWOs).209
In 2002, former Attorney General John Ashcroft further expanded the use of
AWOs in order "to reduce delays in the review process, enable the Board to
204 Arhancet, supra note 24, at 334-35. The immigration judges have "a voluminous
caseload and work constantly and tirelessly to pick away at reducing this large mountain
of cases." Amy C. Hoogasian, Commentary, Immigration Judges, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13,
2006, at C30. One possible explanation for disparities in immigration court decisions is
that Immigration Judges schedule 30 to 70 cases at a time in the absence of law clerks,
bailiffs, stenographers, or enough competent lawyers. Id.
205 Richard B. Schmitt, Immigration Judges Get New Regulations, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2006, at A 15 (stating that Gonzales has proposed establishing periodic performance
evaluations and implementing proficiency exams for judges who are appointed after
December 31, 2006). Currently, there are approximately 224 Immigration Judges.
Gonzales has also proposed adding four members to the 11-person BIA. Id.
206 A number of immigration judges fear that the performance evaluations suggested
by Gonzales would "increase pressure on all judges to make decisions faster, without
weeding out the handful of judges who have drawn the most criticism." Bernstein, supra
note 25. The performance evaluations also raise concerns for "the independence of judges
who by statute are supposed to be neutral, independent decision makers, despite working
for the Attorney General." Id.
207 It is alleged that immigration judges wrongly deport people based on erroneous
evidence or incompetence. "In one instance, an appellate board found that a political
asylum case involving an Albanian citizen was mishandled because the immigration
judge relied on testimony from a document expert who did not speak or read Albanian."
Schmitt, supra note 206.
208 See Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,135-
36 (Oct. 18, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1-.2 (2007)).
209 Chong Shin Chen v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004).
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keep up with its caseload and reduce the existing backlog of cases. '210 A
single board member can currently issue an AWO if he believes that the IJ
reached the correct decision, even if the immigration judge's reasoning is
faulty.211 A single member of the BIA can also affirm an oral opinion issued
by an IJ.21 2
Since the streamlining regulations were implemented, a number of
criticisms have been directed at the use of AWOs. 21 3 Permitting a single
board member to affirm an IJ's decision provides a considerable amount of
discretion in a single board member, which is problematic. 214 Moreover, the
streamlining regulations have not achieved their desired goal of efficiency,
nor have they reduced the high volume of immigration appeals in federal
courts. 2 15 Ironically, the procedural changes had the effect of increasing the
number of immigration cases filed in federal courts.216
210 Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Cases
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,883 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
(2007)). These regulations reduced the size of the Board to eleven members and were
promulgated because it was determined that the Board had been unable to adjudicate
immigration appeals in removal proceedings efficiently in response to the growing
volume of immigration cases. Id. at 54,878. The regulations further limited de novo
review of factual issues. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (2007).
211 Cruz, supra note 62, at 482-83.
212 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.50(a) (2007) (stating that the decision of the immigration
judge may be oral or written). As Judge Posner noted, affirmances without an opinion or
with a "very short, unhelpful, boilerplate opinion," is one of the disturbing features of
immigration cases. Lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2005). The summary
affirmances and non-publication practices are also at odds with the principles of judicial
transparency and accountability. See Richard Acello, Asylum Logjam: Streamlined
Immigration Cases Are Flooding Federal Appeals Courts, 91 A.B.A. J. 18, 20 (2005).
213 See, e.g., Guendelsberger, supra note 99, at 644 ("[A] Board order which affirms
only the result of the immigration judge's decision fails to provide meaningful review or
a reasoned decision for circuit court review."); Schmitt, supra note 206 (stating that
immigrant rights groups allege that the 2002 regulations denied non-citizens their rights
to due process); Ahmed-Ullah & Yates, supra note 24 (stating that critics find AWOs
allow for "rubber-stamping" of bad immigration court decisions). While a number of
petitioners have argued that the single member affirmances of an IJ's decisions violate
procedural due process, virtually all courts have upheld the procedure. KURZBAN, supra
note 13, at 848.
214 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 66, at 1625-27 (explaining that judges are
influenced by a range of external factors such as "their own social and economic
backgrounds and attitudes, their own conceptions of the role of a court, and the social and
political climate of the relevant period"). Thus, providing a high level of discretionary
authority to one member of a board can have dangerous consequences.
215 Following the 2002 streamlining regulations, the rate of Board member rulings
against foreigners facing deportation increased dramatically. Schmitt, supra note 206, at
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Commenting on the use of three member panels in 2002, it is noted that,
"[g]one are the days when the board actually crafted a body of case law,
providing guidance to judges and to those who appear before them. '217 A
number of federal judges have also argued that the streamlining regulations,
which reduced the number of judges on the board to 11 from 23, turned the
board's internal review of IJs' decisions into "a rubber stamp, shifting the
burden of re-examination to the federal courts. '218 Since summary
affirmances fail to provide individualized assessment of claims, 219 more than
one BIA member should review an IJ's decision.
D. Towards a New Judicial Standard
The degree of judicial deference that is generally accorded to
administrative agencies should not be accorded to immigration courts. The
Attorney General "created the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), names
its members, defines its jurisdiction, has the power to dissolve it any time she
wishes, and may reverse any of its decisions. '220 Since immigration law is
15. Those rulings in turn led to more appeals in federal courts, creating another backlog
of cases. Id. Since immigrants felt that their claims were not properly reviewed by a
single member of the Board, they filed petitions for review in federal courts of appeals.
Ahmed-Ullah & Yates, supra note 24, at 22. See also Acello, supra note 213, at 20
(explaining that the number of BIA decisions appealed to the federal courts compared
with the total number of BIA decisions has increased from 5% before 2002 to a current
level of 25%; before the new regulations, federal courts were receiving about 125 BIA
case appeals per month; now they are receiving about 1,000 to 1,200 per month).
2 16 See John R.B. Palmer, Why are so Many People Challenging Board of
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent
Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) ("The procedural changes
and the overall pressure to reduce the backlog have caused the BIA to issue many more
decisions each month, so it is reasonable to expect a proportionate increase in petitions
for review reaching federal courts. The surge however, has been disproportionately
large.").
217 Compernolle, supra note 64, at 30 (letter to the editor written by immigration
attorneys).
218 Bernstein, supra note 25. See also Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Hon. Carlos T.
Bea, Circuit Judge), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cftn?id=
1845&witid=5213 (explaining that since the BIA instituted its one-judge review,
without the more former detailed review, the number of appeals from BIA rulings has
increased).
219 See, e.g., Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the
board's analysis was "woefully inadequate").
22 0 Legomsky, supra note 65, at 1630.
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arguably more susceptible to political pressure,221 greater judicial review is
required in reviewing Immigration Court decisions than the decisions of
other administrative agencies.
1. A New Standard of Review
Currently, the standard and scope of judicial review over final orders of
removal is: "the court of appeals shall decide the petition only on the
administrative record on which the order of removal is based, the
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless" manifestly contrary to
law, and "the Attorney General's discretionary judgment whether to grant
relief under section 1158(a) [the granting of asylum provision] shall be
conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of
discretion. '222 It has been argued that "courts should interpret REAL ID's
restoration of jurisdiction over 'questions of law' to include ... a mixed
standard of review, requiring circuit courts to defer to agency findings of
historical facts, but to engage in de novo review of findings of ultimate
fact." 223
The Second Circuit has recently stated that:
while we lack jurisdiction to consider 'mere disagreement' with the 's
factual findings and exercise of discretion, a reviewable issue of law may
arise in the case of fact-finding which is flawed by an error of law, such as
might arise where the IJ states that his decision was based on petitioner's
failure to testify to some pertinent fact when the record of the hearing
reveals unambiguously that the petitioner did testify to that fact.224
221 See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 67, at 641 (explaining that "extraordinary
provisions" regulating aliens have generally emerged during periods of war or national
emergency); PHILIP G. SHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATrLE TO
SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 225 (2000) (noting that Congress passed IURIRA in
1996 just as a wave of postwar anti-immigrant sentiment spread across the United States).
See also Daniel Kanstromm, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REv. 703, 704 (1997).
222 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2000).
223 Leiderman, supra note 121, at 1368 (proposing that when a court is presented
with a mixed question of law and fact, the court should analyze it to the extent there are
legal elements, but should not review any factual elements).
224 Liu v. INS, 475 F.3d 135, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (holding that
the U mischaracterized a central element of the record). However, it is unclear the extent
to which the Second Circuit will apply this standard, as it has also held that it is unable to
review a decision committed by statute to the Attorney General. See Avendano-Espejo v.
DHS, 448 F.3d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 2005).
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The Ninth Circuit has recently adopted a similar approach, stating that
:"our jurisdiction over 'questions of law' as defined in the REAL ID Act
includes not only 'pure' issues of statutory interpretation, but also application
of law to undisputed facts, sometimes referred to as mixed questions of law
and fact."'225 This approach, however, has not been followed by all
circuits.226
In the context of claims for asylum, withholding of removal due to a fear
of persecution, and protection under the CAT, federal courts could employ
the "benefit of the doubt standard" set forth in the U.N. Handbook.
Acknowledging that asylum seekers fleeing persecution are often unable to
provide documentary evidence to substantiate their claims, the Handbook
suggests, "if the applicant's account appears credible, he should, unless there
are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt. '227 The
Handbook, however, is not binding on U.S. immigration officials and
American courts.228
2. Altering the Ordinary Remand Rule
There is currently no procedure or "statutory mechanism" by which a
petitioner may make a motion in the court of appeals to remand for
consideration of newly acquired evidence to satisfy a petitioner's burden of
proving persecution if removed from the country. 229 Currently, circuit courts
225 Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007) reh'g and reh'g en
banc denied sub nom. Ramadan v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that it
had jurisdiction to review an IJ's decision that a petitioner failed to show changed
circumstances to excuse an untimely filing of an asylum application). This is a departure
from the Ninth Circuit's earlier position where it held that a question of law "refers to a
narrow category of issues regarding statutory construction." Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427
F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005).
226 See, e.g., Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the jurisdiction of a circuit court is limited to "pure questions of law").
227 OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 196 (1992).
228 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1999).
229 Lin v. Dep't of Justice, 473 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2007) (denying a petitioner's
motion to remand his case to the BIA to consider previously unavailable evidence
suggesting that he may face forcible sterilization if returned to the Fujian Province in
China). The relevant statute provides that
[i]f a party to a proceeding to review applies to the court of appeals in which the
proceeding is pending for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the
satisfaction of the court that (1) the additional evidence is material; and (2) there
were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence before the agency; the
court may order the additional evidence and any counterevidence the opposite party
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generally remand a case to a BIA to apply a different legal standard,230 or if
the agency has not made a determination as to a claim that would be
necessary to the outcome of the case.231
Since new country conditions may have an impact on whether a
deportable alien would face a fear of persecution if returned to his country of
origin, appellate courts should be required to remand to an IJ to consider
previously unavailable evidence. 232 Remanding for additional fact finding is
necessary because judicial review of a final order of deportation is restricted
to the administrative record.233 Furthermore, under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, a "court may review a final order of removal only if-the
alien has exhausted all administrative remedies ... as of right. '234 Certain
appellate courts, however, have taken judicial notice of facts outside the
record, especially regarding country conditions.235
desires to offer to be taken by the agency. The agency may modify its findings of
fact, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and may
modify or set aside its order....
28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (2000) (emphasis added). However, the Fifth Circuit has held that
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), an appellate court does not have authority to remand for
consideration of additional evidence. Lin v. Gonzales, 150 F. App'x 326, 327 (5th Cir.
2005).
230 See, e.g., Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2006) (remanding to the
BIA to consider a CAT claim under the correct standard of review); Amir v. Gonzales,
467 F.3d 921, 922-23 (6th Cir. 2006) (remanding to the agency because the U used
wrong standard of proof in a CAT claim); Bushira v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 626, 633 (8th
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (noting that when the BIA applies an incorrect legal
standard, remand is necessary).
231 See, e.g., Jordan v. Gonzales, 204 F. App'x 425, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2006); Bailon
v. Gonzales, 158 F. App'x 36, 38-39 (9th Cir. 2005).
232 This is especially important in CAT claims where a court is obligated to consider
all relevant evidence pertaining to the possibility of future torture, including "(1)
[e]vidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; (2) [e]vidence that the applicant
could relocate to a part of the country... where he or she is not likely to be tortured; (3)
[e]vidence of gross... violations of human rights... ; and (4) [o]ther relevant
information." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2006).
233 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (2000) ("[T]he court of appeals shall decide the
petition [for review] only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is
based.").
234 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2000). The failure to raise an issue before the BIA
constitutes a failure to exhaust remedies with respect to that question and deprives a court
of jurisdiction to hear the issue. See Awad v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the exhaustion requirement operates as a jurisdictional bar and declining to
address an argument the alien did not raise before the BIA).
235 See, e.g., Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 186 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[W]e
may always exercise independent discretion to take judicial notice of any further changes
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It has been noted that permitting appellate courts to take judicial notice
of new country conditions that are absent from the administrative record has
the potential for "wholesale relitigation of many immigration-law claims, but
the Courts of Appeals are ill-equipped to receive supplementary
evidence."2 36 Thus, rather than taking judicial notice of facts outside the
administrative record, the Third Circuit has suggested that Congress "could
require the Courts of Appeals, in their sound discretion, on motion or sua
sponte, to grant petitions for review of the BIA, and remand when it appears
from judicially-noticeable materials that the record compiled before the
agency does not generally reflect contemporary country conditions."237
Remand is important because even when petitioners do raise a claim that an
IJ employed an erroneous legal standard, appellate courts have often rejected
it.238
in a country's politics that occurred between the time of the BIA's determination decision
and our review."); Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (taking
judicial notice of the fact that the Democratic Party returned to power in Albania). Cf
Kamara v. Attorney General 420 F.3d 202, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that it is
precluded from taking notice of new country conditions and must make a decision based
on a closed record in deciding whether to grant a petition for review); Berishaj v.
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 329 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that taking judicial notice of facts
outside the administrative record violates the administrative law principles of SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), that a court reviewing an agency decision must
approve or reject that agency action purely on the basis of the reasons offered by the
record compiled before the agency).
236 Berishaj, 378 F.3d at 330.
237Id. The court found that the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6), which permits aliens
to move to reopen proceedings on the basis of "new facts," and regulation, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2, which permits an alien or the government to move the BIA to reopen
proceedings, and authorizing the BIA to do so sua sponte, permit reopening of asylum
proceedings "based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or
the country to which removal has been ordered.... [W]e encourage the Department of
Justice to adopt a policy that encourages its attorneys to file motions to reopen when the
adjudication of an applicant's claim would benefit from an updated administrative
record." Id. at 330-31. This, however, is not sufficient to remedy the problem of newly
acquired evidence that may have a bearing on whether a deportable alien is likely to face
persecution. The BIA has broad discretion on whether to grant motions to reopen, and
appellate courts often do not overrule a BIA's denial of a motion to reopen a case. See,
e.g., Panjwani v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2005); Fessehaye v. Gonzales,
414 F.3d 746, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The Board's authority to grant or deny a motion
to reopen is discretionary; we therefore review deferentially its decision for abuse of
discretion. Motions to reopen are comparable to motions for rehearing or for a new trial,
and thus are 'strongly disfavored."') (citing Selimi v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 736, 739 (7th
Cir. 2004)).
238 See, e.g., Avendano-Espejo v. DHS, 448 F.3d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 2006)




The REAL ID Act was enacted in part because, following the St. Cyr
decision, federal courts were unclear on which immigration issues were
judicially reviewable. 239 As this Note has demonstrated, the REAL ID Act
has failed to provide clarity with respect to the types of removal claims over
which federal courts have proper jurisdiction. A lack of clarity at the
appellate court level is problematic, some argue, because divergent circuit
court decisions will compel aliens to "forum shop" for favorable courts.240
When the REAL ID Act was passed, the Joint Conference Report
explained that "[n]o alien, not even criminal aliens, will be deprived of
judicial review of such claims [and the act] would give every alien one day in
the court of appeals, satisfying constitutional concerns"; the Report also
claimed the Act would provide every alien a fair opportunity to obtain
judicial review. 241 Rather than providing every alien with a fair opportunity
for judicial review, the REAL ID Act has had the effect of restricting the
scope of judicial review over final orders of removal. This is at odds with the
"strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action. '242
Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, aliens subject to removal
are afforded a "full and fair hearing" 243 and the opportunity to present
evidence on their behalf.244
adjudicating his request for relief, thereby depriving him of his due process right to a full
and fair hearing, amounted to a challenge to the IJ's exercise of his discretion;
"petitioner's attempt to 'dress up' his challenge with the language of 'due process' is
insufficient to provide our Court with jurisdiction to review his claim"); Saloum v. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he mere
assertion ... that the I had failed to apply the law and thereby committed legal error or
otherwise abused his discretion, did not itself establish a question of law over which we
had jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act."); Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1270-
71 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying a petition to review a claim that the IJ denied him a fair and
impartial hearing on grounds that while it has jurisdiction to review a due process
challenge, the petitioner cloaked an abuse of discretion claim in "constitutional garb")
(citation omitted).
239 See H.R. REP. 109-72, at 173-74 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240,
299 (noting that the St. Cyr holding resulted in "piecemeal review, uncertainty, lack of
uniformity").
240 See Swams, supra note 17, at A11.
241 H.R. REP. 109-72, at 174-75 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240,
299.
242 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001) (citation omitted).
243 Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir. 2003).
244 See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that aliens in
removal proceedings should have a meaningful opportunity to present their claims).
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As this Note has demonstrated, a number of deportable aliens seeking
relief from removal are being denied a proper evidentiary hearing before an
immigration judge. This is especially problematic in the context of claims for
asylum and protection under CAT where proof of the persecution is crucial
and newly acquired evidence can have a bearing on whether an alien meets
their burden of proof. While reducing the high volume of immigration
appeals in federal courts is a desirable goal, and deportable aliens should not
be permitted to "shoehorn" any claim into the "question of law" category if it
does not fit there,245 it is precisely in the area of discretionary and factual
determinations that appellate courts have directed their criticisms of
immigration judges and the BIA. 246
In order to provide deportable aliens with fair removal proceedings that
comport with procedural due process, appellate courts must engage in a more
heightened review of immigration court decisions, or significant reforms
need to be directed at immigration courts, the BIA, and the administrative
review process. In the context of claims of asylum, CAT, and withholding of
removal, where a deportable alien has a genuine fear of persecution,
principles of due process should not be forsaken for judicial efficiency.
245 Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2005).
246 See, e.g., Vasha v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 863, 869 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that an
adverse credibility finding is afforded substantial deference, but noting that several of the
inconsistencies identified by the U were unsupported by the record and based on "mere
speculation").
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